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Abstract
Multilevel governance poses several challenges for the politics of climate change. On the one hand, the
unequal distribution of power and interests can serve as a barrier to implementing coherent policy at a
federal level. On the other, these features also enable policy leadership among sub-federal units. In the
context of wide variation in climate policy at both national and sub-federal levels in Canada and in the
United States, this paper utilizes an original data set to examine public attitudes and perceptions toward
climate science and climate change policy in two federal systems. Drawing on national and provincial/
state level data from telephone surveys administered in the United States and in Canada, the paper
provides insight into where the public stands on the climate change issue in two of the most carbon-
intensive federal systems in the world. The paper includes the first directly comparable public opinion data
on how Canadians and Americans form their opinions regarding climate matters and provides insight
into the preferences of these two populations regarding climate policies at both the national and
sub-federal levels. Key findings are examined in the context of growing policy experiments at the
sub-federal level in both countries and limited national level progress in the adoption of climate change
legislation.
KEY WORDS: climate change, public opinion, federalism, multilevel governance, carbon pricing,
Canada, United States
As is the case in other complex policy areas of cross-cutting and shared jurisdic-
tion, multilevel governance poses several challenges for the politics of climate
change. Indeed, recent studies document the difficult politics of implementing
coherent and effective climate policy in federal political systems (Harrison, 2007,
2012; Rabe, 2008, 2011). These difficulties include forging a national consensus in
the face of disparate economic, energy, and emissions profiles among subunits, and
are reflected in the cases of both Canada and the United States, where federal
governments have repeatedly struggled to deliver the type of measures many policy
experts say are required to avert the risks of a changing climate. At the same time,
a substantial number of sub-federal jurisdictions in the two federations have taken
both unilateral and cooperative action to address the issue, enacting policies
ranging from emissions trading and carbon taxation to efficiency standards and
renewable electricity fuel mandates and subsidies (Rabe, 2011; Selin & VanDeveer,
2009). We argue here that a better understanding of public opinion is essential to
interpreting these complex policy developments and for consideration of alterna-
tive policy trajectories moving forward. To the extent that elected officials require
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support from the public, mass opinions, perceptions, and preferences will continue
to play an important role in the politics of climate change in multilevel and feder-
alist political systems.
This paper examines the public attitudes of Canadians and Americans toward
three important dimensions of the climate policy challenge. First, it explores how the
publics in two of the most greenhouse gas (GHG)-intensive economies in the world
perceive the issue of climate change and the reasons why theymay ormay not believe
it is occurring. Second, the paper examines how the publics in the two federations
assign responsibility to different levels of government for policy development––
whether they support unilateral sub-federal initiatives in the absence of federal
leadership or whether they expect amore active federal role in responding to climate
change. Third, the paper assesses what might be learned from the various policy
experiments undertaken by sub-federal jurisdictions in Canada and in the United
States in terms of public acceptability of stricter carbon regulation.
To answer these questions, the paper draws on data from the most recent
National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change (NSAPOCC) and
the National Survey of Canadian Public Opinion on Climate Change (NSCPOCC).
Both administered the identical survey instrument to the Canadian and American
populations at roughly the same time period.2 The data were generated from
telephone surveys using random digit dialing samples in the United States and
Canada, thus providing the first directly comparable public opinion data on how
Canadians and Americans form their opinions regarding climate matters, and on
the preferences of both populations regarding climate policies at both the federal
and sub-federal levels.3 Findings based on these cross-national data contribute to
the growing literature on the source of public attitudes toward climate change
(Borick & Rabe, 2010) and provide a novel look into the previously unasked
question on public perception of government responsibility for climate policy in
federal systems. Finally, while public acceptability is often cited as an important
condition for the enactment of stricter carbon regulations (Harrison, 2012; Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, 2006), the relation-
ship between public opinion and the adoption of various climate policy instruments
remains underexplored, particularly in a Canadian context where much less is
known concerning public perceptions of climate change. This paper provides new
insight into the sources of public support for various instruments of climate policy
and the potential impact such support may have on policy moving forward.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section outlines the motivation
for comparing Canada and the United States in terms of public opinion on climate
change and offers an overview of these two cases. Next, the paper examines views
on climate change and climate science in the two countries. Third, the paper
explores how the public in both federations assigns responsibility to various levels
of government in addressing the climate challenge. The fourth section examines
support for two of the most frequently advocated instruments of climate policy––
emissions trading and carbon taxes. The paper concludes with a discussion of the
importance of public opinion research for understanding the politics of climate
change, reflection on whether public opinion can explain sub-federal policy inno-
vation in the absence of federal leadership, and an outline of directions for future
research.
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Canada and the United States Compared
Comparison is a fundamental tool for political scientists, allowing researchers to
situate their analyses in a broader context in order to reveal broad patterns and
suggestive dissimilarities across cases (Collier, 1993) while also providing some
means of isolating the effects of carefully selected variables on political outcomes
(e.g., public policies, public opinion). Given the vast array of institutional and
cultural affinities and differences between the two federations, comparing Canada
and the United States has a rich history in political science (Lipset, 1990; Simeon &
Radin, 2010), as is increasingly evident in the area of comparative climate policy
research (Burke & Ferguson, 2010; Harrison, 2007; Rabe, 2007; Rabe & Borick,
2012). While comparing the two countries has often revealed important differences,
very large, undeniable, and equally important similarities exist. In particular, the
two federations share a broad set of structural characteristics that make an analysis
of climate change policy and attitudes toward climate policy in particular an inter-
esting object of study. For instance, the two are among the most GHG-intensive
countries in the world, both on a per capita basis (Figure 1) and in terms of the
GHG intensity of their tightly linked national economies (Figure 2).
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the United States and Canada rank among the
world’s most GHG-intensive economies, especially when compared with other
industrialized countries in Europe, placing some (moral) responsibility on publics in
these federations for climate change, given relatively high emissions per capita and
level of emissions per unit of economic activity. The fact that the two countries also
share one of the most tightly integrated bilateral trade relationships in the world,4
(a lack of) policies intended to reduce emissions in one country will have important
policy implications in the other as will public opinion on issues related to energy
policy and climate change. Given the dependence of Canada’s economy on access to
the U.S. market for its goods, for instance, the Canadian government’s explicit
policy is to wait for the U.S. Congress to enact carbon regulations in the hopes of
Figure 1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita in Selected OECD countries, 2009. Source: Energy Information
Administration (2011)
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harmonizing Canadian policy with its largest trading partner and the world’s largest
emitter of GHG (Prentice, 2009). Thus, public opinion in the United States may also
impact policy developments in Canada, indirectly. In addition, the geographic
contiguity and cultural proximity of the two federations provides ample opportu-
nity for such other types of spillover as, to take one example, ideational contagion.5
Despite both Canadian and American governments having set ambitious (albeit
nonbinding) emission reduction targets in the early 1990s, emissions in the neigh-
boring federations continue to rise (Figure 3). Indeed, while annual GHG emissions
from the United States dwarf those from Canada (given the relative size of its
population and economy), Canadian emissions have grown at a much faster rate in
recent decades. Much of this added growth has been driven by the increased
development of its oil sands in part to satisfy increasing American energy demand
Figure 2. Carbon Intensity of Gross Domestic Product Using Market Exchange Rates, 2009. Source: Energy
Information Administration (2011)
Figure 3. Energy-Related Emissions Growth in Canada and in the United States, 1990–2009. Source: Environment
Canada (2009) and Energy Information Administration (2011). Note: Canadian data are for 2008 (latest available at
time of publication)
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(Environment Canada, 2009) and the fact that both have routinely failed to imple-
ment effective policy to mitigate annual emissions of carbon dioxide (Rabe,
Lachapelle, & Houle, unpublished data).
Several factors contribute to the GHG emission profiles and their continued
growth in both countries. While the United States relies more heavily on fossil
energy for the generation of electricity (International Energy Agency, 2009), the two
economies host a variety of energy-intensive industries, including in the areas of
steel and fossil fuel production. In addition, the two are less densely populated than
other advanced economies in Europe and have more limited ground-based systems
for mass transportation. This confluence of factors has resulted in a greater reliance
on personal motorized vehicles to travel farther distances on average and thus more
expansive use of carbon-based fuels. On the whole, Canada and the United States
experienced substantial economic growth over much of the 1990s and 2000s, which
further accounts for the observed increase in energy-related emissions from fuel
combustion, depicted in Figure 3.
These broad characteristics shared by both countries––a geographically contigu-
ous, culturally porous border; high emissions per capita; energy- and carbon-
intensive economies; relatively low population densities; and general reliance on
personal motorized vehicle use for transport––might suggest that the publics in
both countries would have, at a general, aggregate level, similar views based on
shared interests and constraints in terms of limiting their use of fossil fuels. In this
context, the following analysis explores the views of Canadians and Americans in
order to empirically assess public attitudes on issues related to energy policy and
climate change in both countries.
Climate Change and Climate Science
In light of their similar GHG emissions, demographic, and economic profiles, one
might expect to find considerable similarities in public attitudes toward climate
change policy and politics across Canada and the United States. As neighbors
sharing a vast continent and common boundary, one might also anticipate similar
views on the existence of climate change. However, we find considerable divergence
on this issue between citizens of the two federations.
Efforts to measure American public opinion regarding global warming have been
ongoing for a quarter of a century (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). Previous polling of
Americans on the existence of climate change has identified growing levels of
recognition in the 2000s, subsequently followed by a sharp decline in 2009. For
instance, the Pew Research Center reports that in August 2006 and January 2007,
77 percent of Americans agreed that there is solid evidence of global warming (Pew
Research Center, 2009). After peaking at these levels, the same report documents a
sharp decline in the percentage of Americans perceiving solid evidence that global
temperatures are rising, with 71 percent of Americans maintaining this viewpoint in
April 2008 and only 57 percent within this category in October 2009. These data are
corroborated by findings from the NSAPOCC, which asks nearly the same question
as the Pew Center,6 and documents a precipitous decline in American views on the
existence of global warming from fall 2008 (72 percent) through fall 2010 (58
percent).
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While time series data are unavailable for Canada, the 2011 NSCPOCC asked
Canadians the identical question administered in the United States. It found that
four in five Canadians believed that the Earth is warming compared with about
three in five Americans (Figure 4). Levels of conviction on the existence of climate
change in Canada are thus currently much higher than in the United States,
roughly mirroring the level of belief in the United States reported by the Pew
Center in 2006 and 2007. By the same token, Americans are almost twice as likely
as Canadians to state that climate change is not occurring: 26 percent of U.S.
respondents stated that they perceive no solid evidence and only 14 percent of
Canadians responded the same way.
This large discrepancy between Canadian and American views on the existence
of global warming, however, masks important regional differences in Canada. While
opinions in the United States remain relatively stable across regions, significant
differences in levels of belief on the existence of climate change can be found across
the Canadian provinces (Figure 5).7
Contrary to opinion in the United States, which remains relatively stable across
the Northeast (59 percent), Midwest (60 percent), West (56 percent), and South (58
percent), public views on the existence of climate change vary widely in Canada,
depending on the geographic location of respondents. To some extent, these
differences in opinion vary along with the carbon intensity of the Canadian prov-
inces as measured in terms of GHG emissions per capita. For instance, belief in
climate change in the more greenhouse gas-intensive provinces of Saskatchewan
(71 tons of CO2 per capita) and Alberta (72 tons of CO2 per capita) is significantly
lower than the national average of 80 percent.8
Despite these cross-provincial divides in Canada, the largest differences in views
on the existence of global warming in both nations appear across partisan affiliation.
Previous studies of opinion in the United States by Zia and Todd (2010) and
McCright and Dunlap (2011) have provided evidence of a strong correlation
between an individual’s partisan affiliation and his or her views on climate change.
Results from the NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC surveys corroborate this finding, this
time in a Canadian context. Indeed, when comparing respondents across the
Figure 4. Perceptions on the Existence of Climate Change in Canada and the United States. Question
wording: From what you have read and heard, is there solid evidence that the average temperature on Earth has
been getting warmer over the past four decades?
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traditional socioeconomic categories commonly used in public opinion research, the
largest differences emerge when comparing individuals based on their party iden-
tification. In particular, self-identified Democrats in the United States are signifi-
cantly more likely than those identifying as Republicans to state they think climate
change is occurring, while the views of independent voters fall almost directly in
between (Table 1). Some variation in opinion is evident in other traditional demo-
graphic divides, such as gender, age, and educational attainment but is far more
modest than partisan affiliation.
This pattern is repeated in Canada, where significant differences in perceptions
of climate change also emerge across partisan lines. In particular, respondents
identifying as supporters of Canada’s Conservative Party are significantly less likely
Figure 5. Perceptions on the Existence of Climate Change across Canadian Provinces and American Regions.
Figure illustrating provincial and regional differences in response to the question, “From what you’ve read and
heard, is there solid evidence that the average temperature on Earth has been getting warmer over the past four
decades?”
Table 1. American Opinion on the Existence of Climate Change by
Selected Demographics
Yes (%) No (%) Not Sure (%)
Democrat 69 16 15
Republican 41 43 17
Independent 56 31 13
Tea Party member 54 37 10
Non-Tea Party member 59 25 16
Male 53 30 18
Female 63 23 14
18–29 62 28 10
30–44 55 31 14
45–64 64 22 14
65 or older 51 29 20
College-educated 64 25 11
Noncollege-educated 50 28 23
Total 58 26 16
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than supporters of all other parties to agree that average global temperatures have
been warming. Indeed, self-identified Conservative Party supporters in Canada are
nearly three times more likely than supporters of all other parties (including
independents) to express disbelief in climate change (Table 2). There is even less
variation across other traditional demographic variables than in the American case,
further confirming the saliency of the partisan divide.
When examined in a comparative Canada–U.S. context, the data in Figure 5 and
Table 2 indicate that despite large aggregate differences in Canadian and American
views on the existence of climate change, in at least some demographic and regional
categories, opinions of Canadians converge with those of the average American in
general. This is particularly noteworthy in comparing Canadian opinion with that
of self-identified American Democrats. One should caution, however, against infer-
ring a clear causal relationship from these data. Indeed, it is difficult to determine
whether an individual’s views on climate change are determined by his or her party
affiliation (i.e., because he or she is conservative and takes a cue from his or her
preferred party) or whether views on climate change determine party identification
(i.e., he or she supports his or her federal conservative party because of his or her
shared views on the issue). Subsequent research will assess this relationship in
further detail while controlling for other individual and regional predictors of belief
in climate change.
Among several important lines of inquiry in public opinion research on climate
change is the question of why individuals are convinced it is (or is not) occurring.
Results from the most recent NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC surveys indicate some
important similarities among climate change believers across Canada and the
United States. For instance, the most frequently cited reasons for one’s belief that
global temperatures are increasing relate to individual perceptions of local climate.
Interestingly, individuals in Canada and the United States are over twice as likely to
cite warming temperatures and changing weather patterns in their area than any
other factor taken as evidence of climate change (Figure 6).
When given an open-ended opportunity to cite the primary reason that causes
an individual to believe global temperatures are increasing, most respondents who
Table 2. Canadian Opinion on the Existence of Climate Change by
Selected Demographics
Yes (%) No (%) Not Sure (%)
Conservative 64 28 8
Liberal 91 6 3
New Democrat 84 10 6
Bloc Québecois 90 9 1%
Greens 87 3 10
Undecided 80 13 7
Male 79 16 5
Female 80 12 7
18–29 82 13 4
30–44 79 15 6
45–64 79 15 6
65 or older 77 14 9
College-educated 80 14 6
Noncollege-educated 78 16 6
Total 80 14 6
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believe that climate change is occurring in Canada (33 percent) and the United
States (39 percent) note such personal observations as perceived warming tempera-
tures and changing weather patterns in their area. These findings partially cor-
roborate other work highlighting the fact that “experientially derived knowledge is
often more compelling and more likely to influence behaviour than is abstract
knowledge” (Epstein, 1994, quoted in Leiserowitz, 2007). Canadians convinced of
climate change are slightly (4 percent) less likely than Americans to cite melting
glaciers and slightly more (4 percent) likely to report scientific research as their
primary reason. Interestingly, Canadian men are significantly more likely than
Canadian women to cite scientific evidence as a reason to believe. In total, the three
response categories depicted in Figure 6 account for 60 percent of Canadian and 66
percent of American responses to the open-ended question.
One potential source of skepticism regarding the existence of climate change is
the considerable media attention paid to the series of emails, leaked in early 2009,
from climate scientists that suggested their possible manipulation of data and efforts
to overstate evidence of a changing climate. This overlapped with controversies
surrounding some climate data analysis in prominent United Nations reports.
Between 2008 and 2010, the “Climategate” scandal appears to have had some effect
on the views of American respondents (Leiserowitz, Malbach, Roser-Renouf, Smith,
& Dawson, in press). For instance, data from the NSAPPCC indicate that the
percentage of Americans agreeing with the statement “Scientists are overstating
evidence about global warming for their own interests” spiked from 38 percent
when the question was asked prior to the scandal in the fall of 2008, to 47 percent
when the question was asked after the controversy in the fall of 2010.
While data from the NSCPOCC do not allow for this type of natural experiment
(since polling was first administered in early 2011), they do afford an opportunity
to gain cross-national comparison with the most recent U.S. survey findings. Com-
paring across the two countries in 2010–11, Canadian respondents are significantly
less skeptical than Americans regarding the integrity of climate science. As illus-
trated in Figure 7, Canadians are about 10 percent less likely to agree that scientists
are overstating the case for global warming and 10 percent more likely to indicate
that such accusations have no merit. To some extent, this finding is at odds with the
Figure 6. Most Frequently Cited Reasons for Belief in Climate Change. Question wording: And what is the primary
reason that has caused you to believe that global temperatures have been increasing? (open-ended)
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“decline of deference” once observed in Canadian politics (Nevitte, 1996), though
more extensive data would be required to explore this question further.
While American opinion on climate science is currently divided, Canadians
appear slightly more deferential toward and trusting of scientific expertise. The
lack of time series data for Canada does not afford an opportunity for an assessment
of Canadian views before and after the controversy over climate science. However,
the difference observed between the two countries raises the question of whether
differences in media coverage of the scandal may be responsible for the current
divergence in attitudes among Canadians and Americans. Numerous studies in the
United States suggest the media’s portrayal of climate change (or new information
signals) can affect opinions of Americans on this matter (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007;
Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006; Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009; Wood
& Vedlitz, 2007). Future research might test this information hypothesis to look for
systematic differences in media coverage of the climate science scandal in both
countries that may contribute to this difference (Liu, Lindquist, & Vedlitz, 2011).
Who Should Govern the Climate?
In the context of failed national and international attempts at implementing effec-
tive mitigation measures, and in light of innovative practices undertaken by a
number of private institutions and sub-federal jurisdictions to address the issue in
the absence of a federal response, the question of “who governs the climate” has
taken on considerable theoretical and practical importance (Hoffmann, 2011; Rabe,
2008). This is especially true in the multilevel Canadian and American contexts,
where many states and provinces have attempted to fill the policy void left by their
respective federal governments. Despite a host of ambitious commitments begin-
ning in the early 1990s, the federal government in Canada has failed to move
beyond modest spending and voluntary measures to reduce national GHG emis-
sions levels (Rivers, 2010). Similarly, the issue of climate change has been recognized
by American political leadership as far back as the 1980s, yet the prospect of
Congress enacting strict federal policies on GHG emissions remains dim after
reaching a high-water mark during the 111th Congress (Rabe, 2011). More
Figure 7. Canadian and American Views on the Integrity of Climate Science. Statement: Scientists are overstating
evidence concerning global warming for their own interests
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recently, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto protocol it ratified in December 2002,
joining the United States on the outside. This decision is part of a longer disagree-
ment between the Canadian federal and provincial governments on what to do
concerning climate change and contributes to the problem of growing domestic
incoherence across provinces in the regulation of GHG emissions.
Both Canada and the United States can be classified as relatively decentralized
federations, the constitution of each leaving considerable scope for policy innova-
tion undertaken at multiple levels of government and at various governance scales
in the areas of energy and the environment (Burke & Ferguson, 2010). Moreover,
the regional dimensions of the two geographically large federations implies that
sub-federal jurisdictions wield considerable policy authority over relatively homo-
geneous populations, and are home to regionally concentrated industries that are
characterized by distinctive GHG emission profiles and interests. When aggregated
and filtered through the institutional federal framework in both countries, hetero-
geneous sub-federal interests have produced a policy stalemate at the federal level,
while considerable scope and policy autonomy has provided a basis for policy
innovation undertaken by sub-federal jurisdictions in Canada and in the United
States (Rabe et al., unpublished data). Indeed, many U.S. states and Canadian
provinces have taken the lead in unilaterally adopting and coordinating climate
policies even in the absence of a federal role, enacting such avant-garde and diverse
policies as emissions trading, carbon taxes, subsidies for renewable energy produc-
tion, renewable electricity fuel mandates, and the phaseout of coal-burning power
plants (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009). Moreover, municipal governments have increas-
ingly engaged with climate policy, further contributing to the bottom-up pattern of
policy development in both federations (Gore, 2010).
To some extent, this evolution of climate policy development in Canada and the
United States is at odds with the scholarly expectation that national governments
would take the lead in implementing policies at the national level and in construct-
ing a coordinated global response (Giddens, 2009; Stern, 2007). The difficulty
experienced by both federal governments in developing national measures raises
the question of how public perceptions accord with the current lack of federal
engagement on the issue. Similarly, the climate policy leadership experienced in
many U.S. states and Canadian provinces begs the question of how the public
perceives the emerging patchwork of uncoordinated initiatives across American
states and Canadian provinces and whether such developments are at odds with the
public’s assignment of roles and responsibilities of various government levels in
addressing climate change. Data from the most recent NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC
surveys indicate that while the Canadian and American publics place a general
responsibility on the federal level, both publics indicate that national, state, and
local governments all have a responsibility to address the issue of climate change
(Figure 8). This portion of our analysis draws from all respondents, regardless of
their views on the existence of climate change.
As might be expected given the global nature of climate change, the publics in
both federations assign most responsibility to the federal government as evidenced
in the majority of respondents in Canada (89 percent) and in the United States (73
percent), perceiving the federal government as having at least some responsibility
for enacting mitigation policy. Interestingly, the public in Canada (88 percent) and
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in the United States (72 percent) are generally supportive of a provincial/state role,
witnessed in their views that states or provinces have either some or a great deal of
responsibility to take actions to reduce global warming. More generally, the publics
in Canada and the United States assign some responsibility to all levels of govern-
ment, including local and municipal government, though Canadians are generally
more likely to assign “a great deal of responsibility” at all governmental levels. While
these views are consistent with the increased state and provincial engagement with
climate policy in Canada and in the United States, public views are inconsistent with
experience in both countries at the federal level, where engagement remains much
more limited. In line with widely held expectations for a coordinated response, it
appears as though the publics in both countries expect more from their respective
federal governments than they are delivering to date.
In some respects, the absence of federal regulations on GHG emissions has left
a policy vacuum for sub-federal governments to fill. In this context, one reason
underlying support for policy initiatives undertaken by state and provincial gov-
ernments is the lack of federal engagement on the issue (Rabe et al., unpublished
data). Data from the NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC find a majority of respondents in
both countries assign a duty to state and provincial governments to address global
warming should their respective federal governments fail in this regard (Table 3).
While a majority of Americans (62 percent) and Canadians (70 percent) generally
agree that their respective state and provincial governments have a duty to address
global warming in the absence of federal initiatives, Canadians (37 percent) are
more likely than Americans (26 percent) to strongly agree that it is the responsibility
of their state/province to address the problem should their respective federal
governments fail to act. Conversely, Americans are nearly twice (21 percent) as likely
as Canadians (12 percent) to disagree with the same statement.
Figure 8. Public Perceptions of Government Roles and Responsibilities. Question wording: For each level of
government, please tell me if it has a great deal of responsibility, some responsibility, or no responsibility for taking
actions to reduce global warming
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One potential reason why an individual may not support sub-federal initiatives
relates to issues of equity and the free rider problem––a fear that one’s state/
province should not unilaterally bear the burden of GHG mitigation. Interestingly,
we find that the publics in both federations do not appear to follow this logic. The
results of the surveys, both in Canada and in the United States, provide evidence
that a majority of individuals in both federations support unilateral policy initiatives
undertaken by their respective state and provincial governments (Table 4).
The survey results indicate that a majority of Americans (59 percent) and Cana-
dians (62 percent) reject the idea that action taken by their respective state/province
should be conditional upon the actions of others. Canadian respondents in particu-
lar (41 percent) are more likely than Americans (32 percent) to strongly oppose this
kind of conditional support. In other words, while Canadians and Americans share
similar levels of support for unilateral state and provincial policy, Canadians are
more likely to indicate strong support for such leadership, independent of what
neighboring jurisdictions do. This may help to explain recent policy innovations
undertaken by Canadian provinces in recent years (e.g., British Columbia’s broad-
based carbon tax, the first of its kind in North America), which previously lagged
progress in American states. Some caution in interpreting these results is war-
ranted, however, as the negative formulation of this particular question may intro-
duce an element of response bias in some respondents (Schuman & Presser, 1996).
Policy Preferences
In debates surrounding the appropriate policy response to address the issue of
climate change, economists have long advocated a carbon price as the most effective
and efficient instrument for reducing human-made GHG emissions (Baumol &
Oates, 1985). While such market-based mechanisms as emissions taxes and cap and
Table 3. Provincial/State Responsibility If Federal Government Fails
to Act
United States (%) Canada (%)
Strongly agree 26 37
Somewhat agree 36 33
Somewhat disagree 13 14
Strongly disagree 21 12
Not sure/refused 3 4%
Statement: If the federal government fails to address the issue of global
warming it is my province’s/state’s responsibility to address the problem.
Table 4. Opposition to Unilateral Provincial/State Policy
United States (%) Canada (%)
Strongly agree 13 16
Somewhat agree 22 18
Somewhat disagree 27 21
Strongly disagree 32 41
Not sure/refused 7 5
Statement: My province/state should not adopt antiglobal warming policies
unless its neighboring provinces/states also adopt similar policies.
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trade offer many advantages, and though widely supported by renowned econo-
mists (Mankiw, 2007) and international organizations (Jones, Keen, & Strand, 2008;
OECD, 2001), the politics of cost imposition have made their political enactment
difficult. Reflected in various failed attempts to implement carbon energy taxes in
the United States (e.g., Bill Clinton’s failed BTU tax in 1993) and in Canada (e.g.,
Stéphane Dion’s lost election in 2008) and in the ongoing stalemate regarding cap
and trade policy in both nations, important political obstacles have prevented the
national governments in both federations from moving forward with market-based
instruments for climate policy (see for instance, Harrison, 2012; Rabe & Borick,
2012).
At the same time, cap and trade continues to evolve as an important part of the
policy response to climate change (Betsill & Hoffmann, 2011), while some Canadian
provinces have begun to explore the option of carbon energy taxation (Rabe &
Borick, 2012). In the North American and European contexts, previous research
has highlighted the importance of public acceptability as a condition for the political
success of such market instruments (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006;
Harrison, 2010, 2012). The future of market-based instruments in Canada and in
the United States will thus likely be shaped, at least in part, by public support for
these types of policies. The latest NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC offers the possibility of
assessing the feasibility of carbon price instruments in the two federations on the
basis of whether there is a public demand and appetite for such measures. On the
whole, opinions in Canada appear to be more accepting of cap and trade (Figure 9)
and carbon tax (Figure 10) policies than in the United States.
Figure 9. Support for Cap and Trade in Canada and in the United States. Question wording: There is a proposed
system called cap and trade where the government would issue permits limiting the amount of greenhouse gases
companies can put out. Companies that did not use all their permits could sell them to other companies. The idea
is that many companies would find ways to put out less GHG because that would be cheaper than buying permits.
Would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this type of system?
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While the NSCPOCC finds a majoritarian basis of support (58 percent) for a
system of cap and trade in Canada, the NSAPOCC finds substantial opposition (49
percent) in the United States (Figure 9). When supporters are subsequently asked,
“What if the cap and trade program significantly lowered greenhouse gases but
increased your energy costs by X dollars a month?,” opposition in the United States
increases from 59 percent (at $15 per month) to 74 percent (at $50 per month) as
might be expected when a financial cost is linked to a particular policy proposal (Pal
& Weaver, 2003). In Canada, support for a system of cap and trade is relatively
more constant, irrespective of whether respondents are subsequently probed on
associated monthly costs. Support for a system of cap and trade in Canada barely
changes as respondents are told it will impose higher energy costs from $15 per
month to $50 per month.
As is the case with cap and trade, support for carbon energy taxes is higher in
Canada than in the United States (Figure 10). This is true despite the fact that
Canadian voters unequivocally rejected a “green shift” (i.e., carbon tax) proposed
by Liberal Party leader Stéphane Dion in the 2008 federal election (Harrison,
2012). Indeed, 51 percent of Canadian respondents support the idea of a carbon
tax compared with only 22 percent of American respondents who feel the same way
concerning taxing carbon. However, carbon tax opposition actually decreases, and
support substantially increases among Canadian and American respondents at the
level of $15 per month. This may be taken as evidence of how little respondents
understand concerning the cost implications of various climate policies and an
aversion individuals have toward taxation in general, which may potentially be
alleviated when they are provided information regarding the (in this case, modest)
costs involved. Economic context is likely to be important as well (Scruggs &
Figure 10. Support for Carbon Taxes in Canada and in the United States. Question wording: Another way to lower
GHG emissions would be to increase taxes on carbon-based fuels such as coal, oil, gasoline, and natural gas. Would
you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this type of system?
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Benegal, in press), witnessed in the divergence between Canadian and American
responses when the tax is raised from $15 to $50 per month. Future research on the
determinants of public support for carbon taxes should pay closer attention to the
potential role played by information on and sensitivity toward associated costs, as
well as to prevailing economic conditions against which these costs are interpreted.
The issue of cost is central to any discussion of how to address climate change, as
GHG mitigation will necessarily require changes for businesses and consumers
accustomed to their GHG-producing behavior. Given the relatively high GHG
intensity of the American and Canadian economies, mitigation policies designed to
deter the use of fossil fuels will have important implications for the use of carbon
energy sources predominant in the United States and in Canada. In this light, a
greater willingness to pay on behalf of Canadians relative to Americans may par-
tially explain the higher levels of support found for carbon taxes and cap and trade
in Canada (Table 5).
The Canadian and American public somewhat diverge on their willingness to pay
for the development of renewable energy sources. In particular, Americans are
nearly twice as likely (41 percent) as Canadians (21 percent) to indicate that they are
not willing to bear any additional yearly cost for the development of more renew-
able energy. Although Canadians are slightly more likely to express a willingness to
pay more for increasing the availability of alternative fuels, the differences are not
substantial. Interestingly, when these data are examined in an historical context, the
differences found in the most recent NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC surveys largely
disappear. Historically, willingness to pay levels in the United States was substan-
tially higher in 2008 and 2009, corresponding to a relatively more favorable eco-
nomic climate in the United States at that time.
Beyond the public’s willingness to pay, the framing and design of policies may
also shape public views and acceptance of particular instruments (Pralle & Bos-
carino, 2011). Such design features as revenue neutrality and earmarking can have
important implications for public acceptability (Dresner et al., 2006). Moreover, the
question of which level of government should be responsible for collecting rev-
enues, and whether and how the revenue should be shared across regions, has led
to some controversy in both nations. Data from the NSAPOCC and the NSCPOCC
provide some insight into where the public stands on both the question of revenue
use (Figure 11) and revenue collection (Figure 12).
Table 5. Willingness to Pay for Increased Renewable Energy
Production in the United States and in Canada
United States (%) Canada (%)
$0 each year 41 21
$1–49 each year 26 28
$50–99 each year 17 19
$100–249 each year 7 13
$250–499 each year 4 6
$500 or more a year 2 7
Not sure 4 6
Question wording: If it required you to pay extra money each year in order
for more renewable energy to be produced, how much would you be willing
to pay?
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Public attitudes toward revenue use in Canada and in the United States are
strikingly similar and challenge a common view that carbon taxes should be revenue
neutral in order to mitigate public concerns of a government cash grab. For
instance, in both Canada (51 percent) and in the United States (43 percent), the
public expresses a clear preference for earmarking carbon price revenues to the
funding of alternative and renewable energy when given a wide range of options.
This finding resonates with existing tax policy experience, where governments have
legitimated unpopular policies such as gasoline taxes by earmarking revenues to
finance road construction and maintenance, as well as with empirical studies of
political acceptability in Europe (Dresner et al., 2006). On the other hand, relatively
Figure 11. Views on Revenue Use from Carbon Price Policy in Canada and the United States. Question wording: If
the government enacted a policy that required business to pay for the release of greenhouse gases, where do you
prefer the money generated be spent?
Figure 12. Views on Revenue Collection and Use from Carbon Price Policy in Canada and the United States.
Question wording: And which level of government should collect and use the revenue?
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few Canadians and Americans prefer that the money be recycled through rebates,
payments, and tax cuts, which, ironically, is the way most carbon tax jurisdictions
allocate their revenue (Lachapelle, 2010). As shown reading across Figure 11, once
revenue use options are presented, there is also surprisingly low appetite to repeal
the proposed cost imposition policy (i.e., “don’t do it”), should such a policy be
implemented.
In contrast to the clear preferences on the issue of revenue use, the Canadian
and American publics are much more divided on which level of government should
collect and spend revenues from carbon pricing policy. While 50 percent of Cana-
dian respondents prefer that the money be collected and used by the federal
government, a sizeable minority (35 percent) prefers that the revenues remain
within their respective province. In the United States, opinions are more sharply
divided, with 35 percent preferring the money accrue to the federal government
and 39 percent preferring that the revenues remain the prerogative of their home
state. These national aggregates likely mask important regional differences, which
will be analyzed in future work.
Discussion
The data examined in this paper represent one of the first efforts to formally
compare public attitudes on climate change and related policy options between
Canada and the United States using an identical, comprehensive climate survey
instrument administered at roughly the same time. The findings suggest that
despite many similarities in terms of emissions growth, per capita emissions, diffi-
culty in coordinating policy at the federal level, and more recent federal disengage-
ment with the issue, public opinion in the two federations often diverges, sometimes
quite remarkably. For instance, broadly speaking, there appears to be a greater
appetite in Canada for aggressive climate policy, though we also note a more
favorable economic climate existed in Canada at the time of polling. When analyzed
in a historical perspective, it is clear that public opinion on climate change matters
is relatively elastic, evolving over time in concert with short-term weather events
(Krosnick et al., 2006), prevailing economic conditions (Scruggs & Benegal, in
press), as well as with changing legal frameworks governing climate change.
Indeed, as 2011 drew to a close, surveys in the United States had found a rebound
in public acceptance of global warming, with more Americans linking climate
change to extreme weather events while also discounting economic conditions as a
reason for forgoing efforts to address climate change (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-
Renouf, Smith, & Hmielowski, 2011). While future work will test the relative
strength of various influences on public opinion using data from the NSAPOCC
and NSCPOCC surveys, we offer some exploratory remarks here.
Empirically, the foregoing analysis points to an emerging gap between what the
Canadian and American publics expect from their respective federal governments,
on the one hand, and the current level of engagement by these governments in the
area of climate change, on the other.
This disconnect between opinion and policy may be the product of many factors,
including the relatively low priority that citizens, at least in the United States, place
on climate change, particularly during a protracted economic recession that has
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been more severe in the United States than Canada (Pew Research Center, 2010;
Scruggs & Benegal, in press). Conversely, it may also be the case that opinion
responds in accordance with varying levels of policy leadership mobilized at differ-
ent levels. Indeed, our analysis finds broad public support for local policy action
taken by municipal, provincial, and state governments in Canada and in the United
States, which aligns with recent policy developments in recent years. We also
identify potential framing issues for governments moving forward with carbon
pricing policy and note in particular the role of information cues and a preference
for earmarking revenues. These findings add new dimensions to the challenge of
coordinating coherent climate policy in multilevel systems, as the public seems
relatively uninformed concerning the cost implications of various policy options, yet
expect all levels to play at least some role in devising a solution to the problem.
A key theoretical question raised by public opinion research is whether public
opinion matters for policy. While it is clear public opinion should matter in such
representative democracies as Canada and the United States, the relationship
between public opinion and policy outputs is complex. Political preferences are
mediated by a host of such domestic institutions as the electoral system, regionalism,
and federalism, which can complicate the translation of the popular will into actual
policy. Working the other way, opinions themselves may be influenced by the
implementation and expected effects of different climate policies.
The NSAPOCC and NSCPOCC surveys provide some scope for exploring the
nature of the public opinion–public policy nexus. For instance, the historical time
series of public opinion in the United States points to a peak in public concern over
climate change in 2008, corresponding to the 2009 Congressional surge to forge a
national climate policy at the federal level. Whether the subsequent drop in levels
of belief in global warming is partially responsible for the more recent federal
retreat from climate policy remains an open question.9 Conversely, the rise of state
and provincial engagement with climate change corresponds to relatively high
levels of public support for actions taken at this level, even in the absence of federal
leadership and even if neighboring states and provinces fail to implement similar
policy.
Both the NSAPOCC and the NSCPOCC afford some way to assess whether
public opinion might explain why a number of local, state, and provincial govern-
ments have experimented with innovative climate policy in light of the policy
vacuum created by inaction at the federal level. To take one example from the 2011
NSCPOCC, support for carbon tax policy is highest in the two provinces that have
implemented carbon taxes (British Columbia and Quebec), highlighted in darker
shade (Figure 13).
As shown in Figure 13, support for carbon taxation is highest in the two prov-
inces that have successfully implemented a carbon tax.10 The case of carbon energy
taxation is illustrative in that carbon taxes are consistently the least supported policy
instrument by the public yet are often endorsed as the best policy option by climate
policy experts. If public opinion plays a role in government decisions on climate
change policy, it is thus likely to play its most important role in the area of carbon
energy taxation. While other factors are likely at play, the fact that greater public
support is found in the two provinces that passed carbon tax legislation suggests
that opinion may facilitate the implementation of such policies. The same pattern is
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found when looking at support for the idea of cap and trade, which is highest in
those provinces currently involved in setting up the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI) (Figure 14).
As Figure 14 illustrates, support for a system of cap and trade is highest in the
provinces that are active in negotiations around the WCI. The Canadian provinces
of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec are all members of the WCI
and have participated in the preparation of the initiative, which would create the
largest carbon market in North America. While the data do not allow for direct
causal inference, they are suggestive. At the very least, they are indicative of the fact
that public opposition does not increase with experience developing and imple-
menting these types of policies.
In this paper, we have argued that a better understanding of public opinion in
the areas of energy policy and climate change is important, especially in such
GHG-intensive, geographically, and culturally proximate countries as Canada and
the United States. To the extent that responding to climate change will impose costs
Figure 13. Support for Carbon Taxes across Canadian Regions. Figure illustrates the percentage of respondents
expressing moderate to strong support for carbon taxation. Question wording: Another way to lower GHG
emissions would be to increase taxes on carbon-based fuels such as coal, oil, gasoline, and natural gas. Would you
strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this type of system?
Figure 14. Support for Cap and Trade across Canadian Regions. Figure illustrates the percentage of respondents
expressing moderate to strong support for a system of cap and trade. Question wording: There is a proposed
system called cap and trade where the government would issue permits limiting the amount of greenhouse gases
companies can put out. Companies that did not use all their permits could sell them to other companies. The idea
is that many companies would find ways to put out less GHG because that would be cheaper than buying permits.
Would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this type of system?
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on the public, concern for the risks involved, and overall support for various
measures will facilitate their implementation. As elected officials decide on the
future of climate policy at all levels, a better understanding of factors underlying
support for these instruments is thus fundamental. To be sure, we do not claim that
the influence of opinion on policy is direct and determinate. Indeed, Canada’s
recent federal disengagement with Kyoto occurred at a time where polls document
high levels of concern and support for an international treaty (Environics,
2011). However, opinion levels must be interpreted within the institutional struc-
tures (e.g., federalism, the electoral system), which mediate their influence on
elected officials.
The analysis here thus adds a new dimension to the complex politics of govern-
ing the climate in multilevel systems and points to new areas of fruitful research.
Comparing within and across federal systems is one area that may allow for an
increased ability to control for the effects of various institutional variables, while
probing the effects of local weather patterns, slight differences in economic fluctua-
tions, and cross-border effects. Future research should build on these early findings
of the NSAPOCC and the NSCPOCC to develop a better understanding of such
factors underlying public support as changing economic conditions, personal obser-
vations of the climate, new information, public trust, and political ideology at
individual and regional levels of analysis. These findings might then be used to
better understand the complex, potentially bidirectional relationship between
public opinion and public policy as mediated by various political institutions and
may help identify important conditions for policy change. Comparison between
these neighboring North American federations and other multilevel governmental
systems is therefore a promising arena for future research.
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College, the Public Policy Forum, Sustainable Prosperity, Internat Energy Solutions Canada, and the
Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy at the Gerald Ford School of Public Policy at the University
of Michigan.
3 The U.S. sample includes both cellular telephones and landlines, while the Canadian sample is drawn
from landlines only.
4 Canada and the United States are each other’s largest trading partners. In 2009, 73 percent of
Canadian exports were destined for the American market, with 63 percent of total Canadian imports
originating from the United States (Statistics Canada, 2011). While trade with Canada represents a
substantially smaller proportion of total U.S. bilateral trade (23 percent of total exports and 17
percent of total imports), the United States trades more with Canada than with all European Union
countries combined (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). Canada is also the largest foreign supplier of energy
for the U.S. market.
5 Through, for instance, Canadian consumption of U.S. mass media sources. We thank one of the
paper reviewers for raising this point.
6 The Pew Center does not use a four-decade time frame but instead reads “recent decades.”
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7 Regional groupings in the United States were created to increase the sample size of geographic units
and follow standard U.S. Census Bureau regional designations. While this regional classification
likely masks important cross-state differences, the procedure allows for some cross-regional compari-
son to be made.
8 At a 95 percent confidence interval.
9 As suggested by Scruggs and Benegal (in press), fluctuations in the economic cycle may also play a
role here, explaining at once federal disengagement and a decline in public belief.
10 Regional groupings in Canada (shown in Figures 13 and 14) were created in order to ensure a
sample size of at least 100 respondents. Paired jurisdictions share broadly similar emissions profiles.
About the Authors
Erick Lachapelle is an Assistant Professor at the Université de Montréal.
Christopher P. Borick is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Muhlen-
berg Institute of Public Opinion, Muhlenberg College.
Barry Rabe is the J. Ira and Nicki Harris Family Chair of Public Policy and the Arthur F.
Thurnau Professor of Environmental Policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy,
University of Michigan. He is the director of the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy at
the Ford School.
References
Baumol, W., & Oates, W. (1985). The theory of environmental policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Betsill, M., & Hoffmann, M. (2011). The contours of “cap and trade”: The evolution of emissions trading
systems for greenhouse gases. Review of Policy Research, 28(1), 83–106.
Borick, C. P., & Rabe, B. G. (2010). A reason to believe: Examining the factors that determine individual views
on global warming. Social Science Quarterly, 91(3), 777–800.
Boykoff, M. T., & Boykoff, J. M. (2007). Climate change and journalistic norms: A case-study of US mass-media
coverage. Geoforum, 38, 1190–1204.
Burke, B., & Ferguson, M. (2010). Going alone or moving together: Canadian and American middle tier
strategies on climate change Publius, 40(3), 436–459.
Collier, D. (1993). The comparative method. In A. W. Finifiter (Ed.), Political science: The state of the discipline II
(pp. 105–119). Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax
reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904.
Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2011). International energy statistics. Retrieved from http://
www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm
Environics. (2011). Canadians continue to voice strong support for actions to address climate change, including an
international treaty and carbon taxes. December 1, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.environics.ca/reference-
library
Environment Canada. (2009). National inventory report 1990–2008. Greenhouse gas sources and sinks in Canada.
Ottawa, ON: Environment Canada.
Epstein, S. (1994). “Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious”. American Psychologist,
49(8), 709–724.
Giddens, A. (2009). The politics of climate change. Cambridge, MA: Polity.
Gore, C. D. (2010). The limits and opportunities of networks: Municipalities and Canadian climate change
policy. Review of Policy Research, 27(1), 27–46.
Harrison, K. (2007). The road not taken: Climate change policy in Canada and the United States. Global
Environmental Politics, 7(4), 92–117.
Harrison, K. (2010). The comparative politics of carbon taxation. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 6,
507–529.
Harrison, K. (2012). A tale of two taxes: The fate of environmental tax reform in Canada. Review of Policy
Research, 29(3), 385–409.
Hoffmann, M. (2011). Climate governance at the crossroad: Experimenting with a global response after Kyoto. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
International Energy Agency (IEA). (2009). CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. Paris: OECD.
Public Attitudes toward Climate Science and Climate Policy in Federal Systems 355
Jones, B., Keen, M., & Strand, J. (2008). Paying for climate change: Finance and development. Washington, DC: IMF.
Krosnick, J., Holbrook, A., Lowe, L., & Visser, P. (2006). The origins and consequences of democratic citizens’
policy agendas: A study of popular concern about global warming Climatic Change, 77, 7–43.
Lachapelle, E. (2010). Following the doctor’s orders: Carbon tax theory and practice in the OECD. Paper
presented at the ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA.
Leiserowitz, A. (2007). Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: The role of affect, imagery, and
values. Climatic Change, 77, 45–72.
Leiserowitz, A., Malbach, E. W., Roser-Renouf, C., Smith, N., & Dawson, E. (in press). Climategate, public
opinion, and the loss of trust. To appear in American Behavioral Scientist.
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Smith, N., & Hmielowski, J. D. (2011). Climate change in the
American mind: Americans’ global warming beliefs and attitudes in November 2011. Yale University and George
Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale Project on Climate Change Communication. Retrieved from
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ClimateBeliefsNovember2011.pdf
Lipset, S. M. (1990). Continental divide: The values and institutions of Canada and the United States. Ottawa, ON: C.D.
Howe Institute.
Liu, X., Lindquist, E., & Vedlitz, A. (2011). Explaining media and congressional attention to global climate
change, 1969–2005: An empirical test of agenda-setting theory. Political Research Quarterly, 64(2), 405–419.
Malka, A., Krosnick, J. A., & Langer, G. (2009). The association of knowledge with concern about global
warming: Trusted information sources shape public thinking. Risk Analysis, 29(5), 633–647.
Mankiw, G. N. (2007). One answer to global warming: A new tax. New York Times, September 19.
McCright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2011). Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among conservative white
males in the United States. Global Environmental Change, 21(4), 1163–1172.
Nevitte, N. (1996). The Decline of deference: Canadian value change in cross-national perspective. Peterborough, ON:
Broadview Press.
Nisbet, M. C., & Myers, T. (2007). The poll-trends: Twenty years of public opinion about global warming. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 71(3), 444–470.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2001). Environmentally elated taxes in OECD
countries: Issues and strategies. Paris: OECD.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2006). The political economy of environmen-
tally related taxes. Paris: OECD.
Pal, L., & Weaver, R. K. (Eds.) (2003). The government taketh away: The politics of pain in the United States and
Canada. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Pew Research Center. (2009). Modest support for “cap and trade” policy: Fewer Americans see solid evidence of global
warming. News Release. Washington, DC: Pew.
Pew Research Center. (2010). Public’s priorities for 2010: Economy, jobs. Terrorism. News Release. Washington, DC:
Pew.
Pralle, S., & Boscarino, J. (2011). Framing trade-offs: The politics of nuclear power and wind energy in the age
of global climate change. Review of Policy Research, 28(4), 323–346.
Prentice, J. (2009). Speaking points the Honourable Jim Prentice, to the Edmonton Chamber of Commerce. Environment
Canada. Retrieved from http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=en&n=6F2DE1CA1&news=757C0154-
3353-4BB4-B2F3-9E095A0DA33E
Rabe, B. G. (2007). Beyond Kyoto: Climate change policy in multilevel governance systems. Governance, 20(3),
423–444.
Rabe, B. G. (2008). States on steroids: The intergovernmental odyssey of American climate change policy.
Review of Policy Research, 25(2), 105–128.
Rabe, B. G. (2011). Contested federalism and American climate policy. Publius, 41(3), 494–521.
Rabe, B. G., & Borick, C. (2012). Carbon taxation and policy labelling: Experience from American states and
Canadian provinces. Review of Policy Research, 29(3), 359–383.
Rabe, B. G., Lachapelle, E., & Houle, D. (2010). Climate compared: sub-federal dominance on a global issue.
Unpublished manuscript currently under review in J. Wallner, L. Turgeon, M. Papillon, & S. White (Eds.),
Canada Compared. UBC Press.
Rivers, N. (2010). Current federal and provincial approaches to climate change mitigation: Are we repeating
past mistakes? In J. C. Thomas & J. R. Allan (Eds.), Canada: The state of the federation 2009: Carbon pricing
and environmental federalism (pp. 45–60). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Schuman, O., & Presser, S. (1996). Questions and answers in attitude surveys: Experiments on question form, wording,
and context. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Scruggs, L., & Benegal, S. (in press). Declining public concern about climate change: Can we blame the great
recession? To appear in Global Environmental Change.
Selin, H., & VanDeveer, S. D. (Eds.) (2009). Changing climates in North American politics: Institutions, policymaking,
and multilevel governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
356 Erick Lachapelle, Christopher P. Borick, and Barry Rabe
Simeon, R., & Radin, B. (2010). Reflections on comparing federalisms: Canada and the United States. Publius,
40(3), 357–365.
Statistics Canada. (2011). Imports, exports and trade balance of goods on a balance-of-payments basis, by country or country
grouping. Retrieved from http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/gblec02a-eng.htm
Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change: Stern review. New York: Cambridge University Press.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2011). U.S. trade in goods by country. http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/
Wood, B. D., & Vedlitz, A. (2007). Issue definition, information processing, and the politics of global warming.
American Journal of Political Science, 51(3), 552–568.
Zia, A., & Todd, A. M. (2010). Evaluating the effects of ideology on public understanding of climate change
science: How to improve communication across ideological divides? Public Understanding of Science, 19(6),
743–761.
Public Attitudes toward Climate Science and Climate Policy in Federal Systems 357
